So, with an undoubted major war criminal killed by a US bomb all should be looking up for the US/UK forces in Iraq? Well not really. For the US Zarqawi has always played a double role in Iraq, on one hand a brutal terrorist who reduced the chances of a rapid normalisation of security and filled western media screens with images of US/UK failure in their project for Iraq. On the other, a potent symbol of evil that has been used, post-hoc, to justify the extension of the American 'war on terror' into Iraq and who, critically for the US, helped to split the Iraqi resistance movement and played into the 2004 post Falluja 1
divide and rule strategy of Washington and London.
Only a few media sources are commenting on the realistic probable effects for the US/UK. Much as the election of a Shia dominated government in Baghdad was likely to lead to the escalation of attacks against the British in Basra we have witnessed in the last few months, so the death of Zarqawi may lead to a a more unified and effective national resistance movement. Counter-intuitive? Why tolerate the continued occupation of your country by foreign powers when your political objectives have been largely achieved and the main symbol of your hated sectarian rivals has been liquidated? Put another way, large parts of the Shia militia don't need the US/UK anymore and the death of Zarqawi may open the door to the building of alliances against the occupation.
All this could, if key Iraqi players act with much strategic wisdom and restraint, be excellent news for the ending of sectarian terrorism and rebuilding of the shattered sense of national identity. On the other hand the tipping point into irretrievable and deepening civil war may already have been crossed. In either event it is seriously bad news for the US/UKs continued presence and control of Iraq and its assets.
Juan Cole provides comment and translation from an article in
Al-Hayat:
"... sources close to the Sunni Arab resistance movements, among the them the(neo-Baathist) Army of Islam and the Brigads of the 1920 Revolution and the Army of Mujahidin said that Zarqawi's organization, which had announced open war on the Shiites of Iraq, had distorted the motives of the Resistance and harmed its potential. They consider him a martyr, but differ with him in their interpretation (ijtihad) of Islam. One big problem for the guerrilla movement has been that it has largely been ethnic Sunni Arabs, and Zarqawi's tactics made pan-Islamic alliances difficult. The resistance movements appear to hope that with him out of the way, a Sunni-Shiite joint resistance to US presence might become more plausible. Al-Hayat says that they pledged "to intensify their operations during the coming phase against the American forces, as a way of demonstrating the true weight of al-Qaeda." (I.e., the indigenous Iraqi movements are saying that Zarqawi's group is not that important, and they will show who has really been doing the fighting.)"
Finally a nod to the
BBC for this insightful snippet:
"But the insurgents might also use this as a chance to refocus their campaign, perhaps concentrating their fire on the security forces, and away from the attacks on civilians that Zarqawi pursued so cynically.
That in turn could help the fractured insurgency to work together more effectively, and might also help them win more support from the Iraqi people."